Ways to Skin the Zombie Cat: A Look at the Problems Associated with Chalmers's Zombie-Argument

• Main Author: Clifton, Walter Scott
• Format: Others
• Published: Digital Archive @ GSU 2006
• Subjects: philosophy of mind; explanatory gap; thought-experiments; conceivability-arguments; Philosophy
• Online Access: http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/3; http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=philosophy_theses

In contemporary philosophy of mind, the issue of consciousness has taken center stage. Broadly speaking, those who deal with consciousness fall into two camps: those who prioritize empirical work and those who favor conceptual investigation. One prominent argument has served to deepen the divide: the argument for the possibility of zombies. In this paper I intend to examine closely this argument, as it’s presented by David Chalmers, and some of the attempts to discredit it. In so doing, I present some of my own arguments against it, as well as the claim that if it’s sound, then materialism is false. Finally, I present a sketch of a new way of thinking about consciousness that would, I argue, guard against the threat—real or merely apparent—of arguments such as the zombie-argument.