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Previous issue date: 2012-06-25 === In this work, we studied the literature of the interbank market and how a central bank can improve its functioning. We developed a framework that could accommodate the different models of the interbank market and central bank intervention created from Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). With this we show that, in most cases, banks with access to the interbank market are unable to provide the efficient allocation for its consumers. In this environment we find a role for a central bank that, by intervening in the interbank market, is able to induce banks to offer the same allocations that would be provided by a social planner, that is, efficient allocations. === Neste trabalho, estudamos a literatura de mercado interbancário e como um banco central pode melhorar o seu funcionamento. Criamos um framework que pudesse acomodar os diferentes modelos de mercado interbancário e intervenção do banco central criados a partir de Bryant (1980) e Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Com isso mostramos que, em grande parte dos casos, os bancos com acesso ao mercado interbancário são incapazes de prover a alocação eficiente para os seus consumidores. Nesse ambiente, encontramos uma função para um banco central que, ao intervir no mercado interbancário, é capaz de induzir os bancos a oferecerem as mesmas alocações que seriam providas por um planejador central, ou seja, alocações eficientes.
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