Personhood and responsibility

Personhood and responsibility

Show other versions (2)

Understanding human behavior as caused by some combination of genetics, environment, and upbringing is often taken to undermine the belief that human beings can be truly morally responsible. The root of this problem is in an apparent conflict between the casual thesis and the idea of human beings...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Topornycky, Joseph Stephen
Language:English
Published: University of British Columbia 2012
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/2429/42884
id ndltd-LACETR-oai-collectionscanada.gc.ca-BVAU.2429-42884
record_format oai_dc
spelling ndltd-LACETR-oai-collectionscanada.gc.ca-BVAU.2429-428842014-03-26T03:38:52Z Personhood and responsibility Topornycky, Joseph Stephen Understanding human behavior as caused by some combination of genetics, environment, and upbringing is often taken to undermine the belief that human beings can be truly morally responsible. The root of this problem is in an apparent conflict between the casual thesis and the idea of human beings as persons that is premised in moral responsibility. I argue that this con- flict is based on two related misunderstandings. Understood properly, moral responsibility is grounded in our affective responses to others modified by a reflective understanding of those responses under the idea of self-government according to standards. It is through a commitment to those standards that we come to be persons, understood as a distinct moral category. 2012-08-09T17:02:40Z 2012-08-09T17:02:40Z 2012 2012-08-09 2012-11 Electronic Thesis or Dissertation http://hdl.handle.net/2429/42884 eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/ Attribution-NonCommercial 2.5 Canada University of British Columbia
collection NDLTD
language English
sources NDLTD
description Understanding human behavior as caused by some combination of genetics, environment, and upbringing is often taken to undermine the belief that human beings can be truly morally responsible. The root of this problem is in an apparent conflict between the casual thesis and the idea of human beings as persons that is premised in moral responsibility. I argue that this con- flict is based on two related misunderstandings. Understood properly, moral responsibility is grounded in our affective responses to others modified by a reflective understanding of those responses under the idea of self-government according to standards. It is through a commitment to those standards that we come to be persons, understood as a distinct moral category.
author Topornycky, Joseph Stephen
spellingShingle Topornycky, Joseph Stephen
Personhood and responsibility
author_facet Topornycky, Joseph Stephen
author_sort Topornycky, Joseph Stephen
title Personhood and responsibility
title_short Personhood and responsibility
title_full Personhood and responsibility
title_fullStr Personhood and responsibility
title_full_unstemmed Personhood and responsibility
title_sort personhood and responsibility
publisher University of British Columbia
publishDate 2012
url http://hdl.handle.net/2429/42884
work_keys_str_mv AT topornyckyjosephstephen personhoodandresponsibility
_version_ 1716656387289776128

Similar Items