Too Rich to Regulate: Examining the Barriers to the Use of Surveillance in Corporate Crime

Surveillance has long been used as an enforcement tool to detect conventional crimes and identify and punish offenders. However, its watchful gaze has been strategically directed away from the area of corporate crime. Corporate crime has long been under-studied and under-researched, despite the fact...

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Main Author: Zhang, Nancy
Other Authors: Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Theses (Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.))
Language:en
en
Published: 2011
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1974/6420
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spelling ndltd-LACETR-oai-collectionscanada.gc.ca-OKQ.1974-64202013-12-20T03:40:01ZToo Rich to Regulate: Examining the Barriers to the Use of Surveillance in Corporate CrimeZhang, Nancycorporate crimewhite-collar crimeregulationsurveillanceSurveillance has long been used as an enforcement tool to detect conventional crimes and identify and punish offenders. However, its watchful gaze has been strategically directed away from the area of corporate crime. Corporate crime has long been under-studied and under-researched, despite the fact that the damages it causes amount to millions, even billions, of dollars. Its omission from the surveillant gaze, however, has been no accident. Because corporate offenders hold higher positions in society and possess greater political and economic resources than conventional street criminals, corporate offenders have often been able to resist the regulatory attempts against them. This thesis explores the underuse of surveillance as an enforcement tool in corporate crime, but also examines the regulatory climate that perpetuates this. It explores the main tools for addressing criminal and regulatory violations that are used by law enforcement agencies charged with enforcing corporate crime. This thesis identifies and examines five barriers—cultural, political, economic, legal, and technological—that have acted to limit and even prevent surveillance as a tool of regulation against corporate crime. Through an analysis of academic literature and public sources, this thesis assesses the small number of initiatives where surveillance strategies have been attempted in the field of corporate crime and investigates the reasons the attempts have been limited in number, scope and effect. The aim of this thesis is to draw attention to underuse of surveillance in corporate crime and question the current regulatory framework.Thesis (Master, Sociology) -- Queen's University, 2011-04-26 14:38:11.581Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Theses (Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.))2011-04-26 14:38:11.5812011-04-27T15:13:06Z2011-04-27T15:13:06Z2011-04-27T15:13:06ZThesishttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/6420enenCanadian thesesThis publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.
collection NDLTD
language en
en
sources NDLTD
topic corporate crime
white-collar crime
regulation
surveillance
spellingShingle corporate crime
white-collar crime
regulation
surveillance
Zhang, Nancy
Too Rich to Regulate: Examining the Barriers to the Use of Surveillance in Corporate Crime
description Surveillance has long been used as an enforcement tool to detect conventional crimes and identify and punish offenders. However, its watchful gaze has been strategically directed away from the area of corporate crime. Corporate crime has long been under-studied and under-researched, despite the fact that the damages it causes amount to millions, even billions, of dollars. Its omission from the surveillant gaze, however, has been no accident. Because corporate offenders hold higher positions in society and possess greater political and economic resources than conventional street criminals, corporate offenders have often been able to resist the regulatory attempts against them. This thesis explores the underuse of surveillance as an enforcement tool in corporate crime, but also examines the regulatory climate that perpetuates this. It explores the main tools for addressing criminal and regulatory violations that are used by law enforcement agencies charged with enforcing corporate crime. This thesis identifies and examines five barriers—cultural, political, economic, legal, and technological—that have acted to limit and even prevent surveillance as a tool of regulation against corporate crime. Through an analysis of academic literature and public sources, this thesis assesses the small number of initiatives where surveillance strategies have been attempted in the field of corporate crime and investigates the reasons the attempts have been limited in number, scope and effect. The aim of this thesis is to draw attention to underuse of surveillance in corporate crime and question the current regulatory framework. === Thesis (Master, Sociology) -- Queen's University, 2011-04-26 14:38:11.581
author2 Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Theses (Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.))
author_facet Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Theses (Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.))
Zhang, Nancy
author Zhang, Nancy
author_sort Zhang, Nancy
title Too Rich to Regulate: Examining the Barriers to the Use of Surveillance in Corporate Crime
title_short Too Rich to Regulate: Examining the Barriers to the Use of Surveillance in Corporate Crime
title_full Too Rich to Regulate: Examining the Barriers to the Use of Surveillance in Corporate Crime
title_fullStr Too Rich to Regulate: Examining the Barriers to the Use of Surveillance in Corporate Crime
title_full_unstemmed Too Rich to Regulate: Examining the Barriers to the Use of Surveillance in Corporate Crime
title_sort too rich to regulate: examining the barriers to the use of surveillance in corporate crime
publishDate 2011
url http://hdl.handle.net/1974/6420
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