Agents, patients, and moral discourse
Assuming that moral discourse is prescriptive, what distinguishes it from other types of prescriptive discourse? To say, as Hare does, that it is its overridingness, is subject both to criticisms that assume that overridingness could, in principle, be used to distinguish one type of prescriptive dis...
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McGill University
1987
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ndltd-LACETR-oai-collectionscanada.gc.ca-QMM.757512014-02-13T04:04:46ZAgents, patients, and moral discourseHajdin, ManeEthical relativismMoral developmentAssuming that moral discourse is prescriptive, what distinguishes it from other types of prescriptive discourse? To say, as Hare does, that it is its overridingness, is subject both to criticisms that assume that overridingness could, in principle, be used to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, and then show that it is doubtful that moral discourse is overriding, and to the criticisms that claim that it is in principle impossible to use overridingness to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, because all of them are bound to be on a par in respect of overridingness.It is also impossible to distinguish moral discourse from other types of prescriptive discourse by saying that in it we use arguments based on imaginatively putting oneself in the shoes of others, because such arguments are used in prudential discourse as well. However, we can account for the distinction, if we realize that such arguments can be performed only on certain designated argument-places, and that in moral claims argument-places of two different types are designated for the purpose: those for moral agents and those for moral patients; while in prudential claims argument-places of only one type are designated: those for prudential agents.If this account is accepted, this raises a number of further questions. Examination of these questions leads to a form of relativism about membership in the sets of moral agents and moral patients. This form of relativism, however, leaves considerable room for rational discussion of membership in these sets and is compatible with the rejection of relativism about the content of moral rules.McGill University1987Electronic Thesis or Dissertationapplication/pdfenalephsysno: 000660134proquestno: AAINL46102Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest.All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.Doctor of Philosophy (Department of Philosophy.) http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=75751 |
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Others
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Ethical relativism Moral development |
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Ethical relativism Moral development Hajdin, Mane Agents, patients, and moral discourse |
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Assuming that moral discourse is prescriptive, what distinguishes it from other types of prescriptive discourse? To say, as Hare does, that it is its overridingness, is subject both to criticisms that assume that overridingness could, in principle, be used to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, and then show that it is doubtful that moral discourse is overriding, and to the criticisms that claim that it is in principle impossible to use overridingness to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, because all of them are bound to be on a par in respect of overridingness. === It is also impossible to distinguish moral discourse from other types of prescriptive discourse by saying that in it we use arguments based on imaginatively putting oneself in the shoes of others, because such arguments are used in prudential discourse as well. However, we can account for the distinction, if we realize that such arguments can be performed only on certain designated argument-places, and that in moral claims argument-places of two different types are designated for the purpose: those for moral agents and those for moral patients; while in prudential claims argument-places of only one type are designated: those for prudential agents. === If this account is accepted, this raises a number of further questions. Examination of these questions leads to a form of relativism about membership in the sets of moral agents and moral patients. This form of relativism, however, leaves considerable room for rational discussion of membership in these sets and is compatible with the rejection of relativism about the content of moral rules. |
author |
Hajdin, Mane |
author_facet |
Hajdin, Mane |
author_sort |
Hajdin, Mane |
title |
Agents, patients, and moral discourse |
title_short |
Agents, patients, and moral discourse |
title_full |
Agents, patients, and moral discourse |
title_fullStr |
Agents, patients, and moral discourse |
title_full_unstemmed |
Agents, patients, and moral discourse |
title_sort |
agents, patients, and moral discourse |
publisher |
McGill University |
publishDate |
1987 |
url |
http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=75751 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT hajdinmane agentspatientsandmoraldiscourse |
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