| Summary: | The following thesis describes and analyzes the development of the U.S. slot allocation system from 1968 until today, in order to draw relevant conclusions for a new European Slot Regulation. The European Commission is currently drafting a new Slot Regulation purporting to introduce market mechanisms. A similar approach was espoused in the United States from 1986 onward, but was ultimately supplanted by overriding legislation in 2000. The analysis of the U.S. slot allocation system reveals the reasons underlying its abolition and queries whether this experience can be successfully transposed in Europe. The thesis commences by providing general information on the definition of slots, slot allocation, and airport capacity. A brief review of the European Commission's current consultation process on the implementation of market mechanisms for slot allocation follows. The main part of the thesis discusses the U.S. High Density Rule and the Rules for the Allocation and Transfer of High Density Airport Slots in historical order. Some criticisms frequently voiced assert that the Rules artificially limited access to airports, constituted barriers to market entry, restricted airline competition, generated higher fares, and yielded adverse effects on smaller communities which, in turn, lost access to key markets. Through a favorable assessment of the Rules, the thesis analyses these concerns and concludes that the suppression of the Rules was rather prompted by local political motivations than by other rationalities. However, experiences drawn from the U.S. Rules demonstrate that a future European secondary market for slots, if implemented under a grand fathering system, will likely have a positive impact on the efficiency of airport capacity, but not on access to the market and competition.
|
|---|
