| Summary: | The dissertation studies two aspects of the U.S. registered investment companies. The first essay analyzes the ownership and organizational structure aspect while the second essay investigates the restructure events of those investment companies. We find sellers from mutual fund asset sales are mainly financial conglomerates. Funds under management of those conglomerates experience poor performance during the period prior to asset sales. On the other hand, acquirers are generally highly focused mutual fund companies. Funds acquired by these focused entities experience improvement in both fund performance and operational efficiency. From the analysis of organizational structure, funds managed by focused mutual fund companies demonstrate better performance and operating efficiency than those of diversified ones. Funds managed by diversified fund companies also experience performance deterioration during years following their IPOs, while focused counterparts encounter performance enhancement. From the analysis of ownership structure, funds managed by public mutual fund entities outperform their private competitors. Our evidence indicates that (1) organizational structure (level of concentration), (2) economies of scale, (3) strengthened monitoring, and (4) managerial ownership contribute to the superior performance and greater operating efficiency that occur subsequent to asset sales in the mutual fund industry. We propose (1) a public trade, (2) a focused business line, and (3) a large insider ownership to explain the outperformance and management efficiency. Our results not only contribute to the dynamic of mutual fund operations but also explain the evolution of business model for the industry organizations of the past decades.
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