Inequity-Averse Preferences in the Principal-Agent Framework

Inequity-Averse Preferences in the Principal-Agent Framework

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schumacher, Tyler R.
Language:English
Published: Miami University / OhioLINK 2018
Subjects:
Economics
Behaviorial Sciences
Experiments
Inequity aversion
experiments
economics
behavioral economics
maximum likelihood estimation
quantal response equilibrium
MLE
QRE
Online Access:http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami153299521737861
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spelling ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-miami1532995217378612021-08-03T07:07:54Z Inequity-Averse Preferences in the Principal-Agent Framework Schumacher, Tyler R. Economics Behaviorial Sciences Experiments Inequity aversion experiments economics behavioral economics maximum likelihood estimation quantal response equilibrium MLE QRE We examine a contracting relationship in the principal-agent framework with groupingsof one principal and two agents, particularly employing the Fehr-Schmidt functional formto allow for inequity aversion. When imposing that there is no guilt parameter, ß, we findsignificant evidence that the envy parameter (a) is statistically different from zero whenwe allow agents to reference other agents for payoff comparisons, but we find that theenvy parameter is not significantly different from zero when allowing for an agent toreference the principal in payoff comparisons. These results are suggestive of aphenomenon wherein those under a contract relationship make “horizontal” payoffcomparisons and are motivated to minimize inequity with respect to those in similarroles, but do not show such motivation when comparing “vertically” to those in rolesdifferent from them. If our results are indeed robust, this behavioral phenomenon couldhave implications on the nature of trends in wage dispersion explained at the level ofmotivation within individual contract negotiations. 2018-07-31 English text Miami University / OhioLINK http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami153299521737861 http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami153299521737861 unrestricted This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws.
collection NDLTD
language English
sources NDLTD
topic Economics
Behaviorial Sciences
Experiments
Inequity aversion
experiments
economics
behavioral economics
maximum likelihood estimation
quantal response equilibrium
MLE
QRE
spellingShingle Economics
Behaviorial Sciences
Experiments
Inequity aversion
experiments
economics
behavioral economics
maximum likelihood estimation
quantal response equilibrium
MLE
QRE
Schumacher, Tyler R.
Inequity-Averse Preferences in the Principal-Agent Framework
author Schumacher, Tyler R.
author_facet Schumacher, Tyler R.
author_sort Schumacher, Tyler R.
title Inequity-Averse Preferences in the Principal-Agent Framework
title_short Inequity-Averse Preferences in the Principal-Agent Framework
title_full Inequity-Averse Preferences in the Principal-Agent Framework
title_fullStr Inequity-Averse Preferences in the Principal-Agent Framework
title_full_unstemmed Inequity-Averse Preferences in the Principal-Agent Framework
title_sort inequity-averse preferences in the principal-agent framework
publisher Miami University / OhioLINK
publishDate 2018
url http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami153299521737861
work_keys_str_mv AT schumachertylerr inequityaversepreferencesintheprincipalagentframework
_version_ 1719454397885317120

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