| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學系 === 85 === An Empirical test on Taiwan government bond auction is
reported, focusing on differences in performance uner uniform-
price versus diwcriminatory-price formats and the Winner''s
Curse". When the assumption of Revenue Equivalent Theorem is
released, the auction format would affect biddingbehavior and
seller''s revenue. This study examines Taiwan government bond
auction for period 1995-96. The auctioneer''s revenues from
government bond primary market as a discriminatory auction
versus a uniform-price auction are compared, results suggest the
uniform-price auction will yield higher revenue thought it''s not
significant. Results also suggest that under discriminatory-
price format bidders account for the winner''s curse and bid
morecautiously, and finally this results in the centralizationof
bidding distribution.
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