An Empirical Study of Taiwan Government Bond Auction and the "Winner''s Curse"
碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學系 === 85 === An Empirical test on Taiwan government bond auction is reported, focusing on differences in performance uner uniform- price versus diwcriminatory-price formats and the Winner''s Curse". When the assumptio...
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ndltd-TW-085NTU003040342016-07-01T04:15:36Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82315745127965936258 An Empirical Study of Taiwan Government Bond Auction and the "Winner''s Curse" 台灣公債標售與贏家詛咒之實證研究 Hsu, Ling-Pei 許鈴佩 碩士 國立臺灣大學 財務金融學系 85 An Empirical test on Taiwan government bond auction is reported, focusing on differences in performance uner uniform- price versus diwcriminatory-price formats and the Winner''s Curse". When the assumption of Revenue Equivalent Theorem is released, the auction format would affect biddingbehavior and seller''s revenue. This study examines Taiwan government bond auction for period 1995-96. The auctioneer''s revenues from government bond primary market as a discriminatory auction versus a uniform-price auction are compared, results suggest the uniform-price auction will yield higher revenue thought it''s not significant. Results also suggest that under discriminatory- price format bidders account for the winner''s curse and bid morecautiously, and finally this results in the centralizationof bidding distribution. Tsun-Siou Lee, Hsiaw-Chan Yeh 李存修, 葉小蓁 1997 學位論文 ; thesis 77 zh-TW |
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zh-TW |
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Others
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NDLTD |
description |
碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學系 === 85 === An Empirical test on Taiwan government bond auction is
reported, focusing on differences in performance uner uniform-
price versus diwcriminatory-price formats and the Winner''s
Curse". When the assumption of Revenue Equivalent Theorem is
released, the auction format would affect biddingbehavior and
seller''s revenue. This study examines Taiwan government bond
auction for period 1995-96. The auctioneer''s revenues from
government bond primary market as a discriminatory auction
versus a uniform-price auction are compared, results suggest the
uniform-price auction will yield higher revenue thought it''s not
significant. Results also suggest that under discriminatory-
price format bidders account for the winner''s curse and bid
morecautiously, and finally this results in the centralizationof
bidding distribution.
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author2 |
Tsun-Siou Lee, Hsiaw-Chan Yeh |
author_facet |
Tsun-Siou Lee, Hsiaw-Chan Yeh Hsu, Ling-Pei 許鈴佩 |
author |
Hsu, Ling-Pei 許鈴佩 |
spellingShingle |
Hsu, Ling-Pei 許鈴佩 An Empirical Study of Taiwan Government Bond Auction and the "Winner''s Curse" |
author_sort |
Hsu, Ling-Pei |
title |
An Empirical Study of Taiwan Government Bond Auction and the "Winner''s Curse" |
title_short |
An Empirical Study of Taiwan Government Bond Auction and the "Winner''s Curse" |
title_full |
An Empirical Study of Taiwan Government Bond Auction and the "Winner''s Curse" |
title_fullStr |
An Empirical Study of Taiwan Government Bond Auction and the "Winner''s Curse" |
title_full_unstemmed |
An Empirical Study of Taiwan Government Bond Auction and the "Winner''s Curse" |
title_sort |
empirical study of taiwan government bond auction and the "winner''s curse" |
publishDate |
1997 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82315745127965936258 |
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