The Patterns of Contract Choice of Farming : the Transaction Cost Approach
博士 === 國立政治大學 === 地政學系 === 86 === This thesis included two parts. In the first part of this thesis, under theassumption of private property right, we extended Cheung''s model(1969),byincorporating owned farms and transaction cost in the general...
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ndltd-TW-086NCCU01330112015-10-13T11:03:31Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67283685738114728051 The Patterns of Contract Choice of Farming : the Transaction Cost Approach 農業經營方式契約選擇之研究─從交易成本觀點分析 Ho, Yu-Ming 何宇明 博士 國立政治大學 地政學系 86 This thesis included two parts. In the first part of this thesis, under theassumption of private property right, we extended Cheung''s model(1969),byincorporating owned farms and transaction cost in the general equilibrium modelof the choice farm patterns. By comparative approach, the data of Chinese farms(1920s-1940s) and of world census of agriculture(1970) were used to test the above theoretical model . The major finding of this study were that,firstly, there is no ranking of operation efficiency on patterns of farms. Secondly, the view of Cheung, that the share tenancy is as efficient as fixed-rentcontract farms and wage contract farms, can not be sustained.The main reason is that under different circumstance, the tenant and the landlord would choice different patterns of contracts, in order to reduce their transaction cost.In the second part of this thesis, the assumption of private property rightwas relaxed, we analysis the effect of government intervention on the patterns of contract choice of farming. We use the new institutional economic theory, especially the theory of institutional change extended by North(1981,1990),to explain why, due to the transaction cost ,there is a interaction relationship between the institution choice and the contract choice.We also use Dream-Tyan institution ,which was enforced from Bay-Wei Dynasty( A. D. 485)to the middle Toan Dynasty(A. D.780), and the postwar Taiwan agricultural land institution, as the case study to explain the theory we haveextended. The major finding of the second part of this thesis was that, due togovernment intervention on the patterns of contract choice of farming ,the transaction cost was increased. Lin Sen-Tyan 林森田 1998 學位論文 ; thesis 146 zh-TW |
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博士 === 國立政治大學 === 地政學系 === 86 === This thesis included two parts. In the first part of this
thesis, under theassumption of private property right, we
extended Cheung''s model(1969),byincorporating owned farms and
transaction cost in the general equilibrium modelof the choice
farm patterns. By comparative approach, the data of Chinese
farms(1920s-1940s) and of world census of agriculture(1970) were
used to test the above theoretical model . The major finding of
this study were that,firstly, there is no ranking of operation
efficiency on patterns of farms. Secondly, the view of Cheung,
that the share tenancy is as efficient as fixed-rentcontract
farms and wage contract farms, can not be sustained.The main
reason is that under different circumstance, the tenant and the
landlord would choice different patterns of contracts, in order
to reduce their transaction cost.In the second part of this
thesis, the assumption of private property rightwas relaxed, we
analysis the effect of government intervention on the patterns
of contract choice of farming. We use the new institutional
economic theory, especially the theory of institutional change
extended by North(1981,1990),to explain why, due to the
transaction cost ,there is a interaction relationship between
the institution choice and the contract choice.We also use
Dream-Tyan institution ,which was enforced from Bay-Wei Dynasty(
A. D. 485)to the middle Toan Dynasty(A. D.780), and the postwar
Taiwan agricultural land institution, as the case study to
explain the theory we haveextended. The major finding of the
second part of this thesis was that, due togovernment
intervention on the patterns of contract choice of farming ,the
transaction cost was increased.
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author2 |
Lin Sen-Tyan |
author_facet |
Lin Sen-Tyan Ho, Yu-Ming 何宇明 |
author |
Ho, Yu-Ming 何宇明 |
spellingShingle |
Ho, Yu-Ming 何宇明 The Patterns of Contract Choice of Farming : the Transaction Cost Approach |
author_sort |
Ho, Yu-Ming |
title |
The Patterns of Contract Choice of Farming : the Transaction Cost Approach |
title_short |
The Patterns of Contract Choice of Farming : the Transaction Cost Approach |
title_full |
The Patterns of Contract Choice of Farming : the Transaction Cost Approach |
title_fullStr |
The Patterns of Contract Choice of Farming : the Transaction Cost Approach |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Patterns of Contract Choice of Farming : the Transaction Cost Approach |
title_sort |
patterns of contract choice of farming : the transaction cost approach |
publishDate |
1998 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67283685738114728051 |
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