| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系 === 86 === Resale price maintenance (RPM) which is usually imposed by
manufacturer is not allowed under Fair Trade Law, article 18,in
Taiwan. The main reason is that authority wants to keep the
market competition and try to avoid the unfair trade incurred by
consumers. However, RPM contract may also have efficient
influence to the social welfare.When downstream retailer could
affect demand by non-price factors, such as sale service. These
factors have a lot of influence to demand, but it is costly for
upstream manufacturers to monitor these factors. Therefore,
these factors becomes uncontractible. The manufacturers also
control some non-price factors, such as product quality, and
these factors affect demand, too. The high monitoring cost makes
the behaviors of manufacturer are not contractible, either. The
problem of double moral hazard thus exists in the vertical
relationship. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the
effects of vertical restraints in the case of successive
monopoly as well as in that of one manufacturer with two
retailers when double moral hazard problem emerges between
manufacturer and retailer.This paper found that RPM contract can
reduce double moral hazard problem and increase consumer
surplus and social welfare in both monopoly and duopoly retail
market. Though, it can not achieve the best equilibrium of
manufacturer under vertical integration. Comparing with RPM,
franchise fee contract will be preferred in monopolistic
retailer case, because it can achieve the manufacturer's first-
best outcome. But in the duopolistic retailer case, optimal
contract should include both franchise fee and RPM asin Romano'
s.
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