| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 俄羅斯研究所 === 87 === After dissection of Soviet Union, Russia Union has gradually turned to a pattern of democratic nation, similar to the enforcement of democratic innovation by the government of ROC after 1987. ROC, before release of martial law enforcement, enforced authoritative oligarchy system. Soviet Union enforced oligarchy system as well. Both nations used intelligence sectors to solidify ruling right. However, how the intelligence sectors of both nations, while encountering the process of democracy and legalization, comply with the democracy and legalization trend initiates the motivation of the author in writing this paper.
This paper attempts to, based on the democratic and judicial nations as standard, study the performance of such intelligence sectors as the Federal Security Service of Russia, the National Security Bureau and Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of ROC, whether they already timely and sufficiently reflect the domestic environment requirement in democracy transition process.
The research of the paper finds, the Federal Security Service of Russia is still considered as a successor to KGB, and a tool to solidify the ruling right of Yelchin under democratic system. In the aspect of the intelligence sectors of ROC, the authority centralization color of National Security Bureau is thick, which, command various intelligence sectors, with actual practice to fail to conform to the “intelligence & administration separation” principle of a democratic nation. Besides, the Investigation Bureau belongs to the Ministry of Justice in administration, yet under the instruction of National Security Bureau in its business, forming a situation of “dual division of intelligence”, causing much chaos.
It is recommended in the paper, ROC to follow the intelligence system of the advanced nations, by establishing an intelligence committee, to make intelligence sectors under restriction of democracy. Furthermore, intelligence supervision laws shall be established, to set up strict confidentiality specifications , forming a jointly observed game rule. At last, the intelligence system shall be promoted to be legalized, to specify the intelligence activities, and, through comprehensive laws, to release public suspicion about intelligence activities. Only in this way can it help the national security work to be in the right path, to conform to the function of intelligence sectors in providing alarm and protection of national security as required by a democratic nation.
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