| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 財務金融學系 === 87 === Facing an competitive and uncertain environment the bank could go bankrupt. If the value of bank assets is insufficient to meet the debt oligations, bank’s shareholders and debtholhers will face losses of wealth. Debt financing under limited liability creates conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders. From viewpoint of agent relationship, the firm’s manager who is an agent of shareholders and debtholders should seek for shareholder wealth and debtholder wealth. In the bank, debt financing affects not only liabilities on Balance Sheet, but also interest margins on Income Statement.
According to above reasons, this paper establishes a banking firm model of which object could be wealth-maximizing shareholders or wealth-maximizing debtholders under limited liability , considering imperfect competitive and uncertain conditions and using character of liabilities. Then, this paper examines the relationship between assets value and deposit liabilities.
The model’s results is shown that the change in the possibility of bankruptcy banking firm will adopt different deposit liabilities under different object.
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