| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 88 === Nowadays, it is a trend that the owner assigns some decisions to the manager. However, if the owner and the manager are different persons, the agency problem emerges. One way to reduce the agency problem is hiring the internal auditor to monitor the manager’s action. Thus this study applies game theory to investigate the relationship among the owner, the manager and the internal auditor.
The main results are：First, in the one-period game without monitoring mechanism, the manager will surely shirk. If the monitoring mechanism is at work, the manager’s motive of hard working will increase whenever the punishment is more severe, the possibility for the internal auditor to monitor is higher, or the internal auditor’s ability is higher. On the other hand, the internal auditor’s incentive to monitor will increase whenever the punishment is more severe, the internal auditor’s ability is higher or the cost of carrying out the monitoring is lower. Second, when the cost of the owner’s execution of monitoring is higher than the cost of hiring the internal auditor, the owner will prefer to hire the internal auditor to carry out the monitoring. In general, the cost for the owner to carry out the monitoring task is higher for larger organization. In this case, the owner prefers to hire the internal auditor to do the monitoring. Third, the collusion between the internal auditor and the manager or the owner can be lessened through the designing of wage contracts and the punishment mechanism or the hiring of the external auditor.
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