| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 美國研究所 === 88 === During the 1960s and 1970s, the interest group universe in the United States underwent tremendous changes. Founded in 1970, Common Cause has been one of the public interest groups that play an active role in the American political arena.
This research is a thorough study on the behavior and internal politics of Common Cause, a discussion on how it adapts to the changes in the environment and the logic of agenda-setting its entrepreneurs embraced. Conducted by theory-confirming method and case study method, three hypotheses are drawn respectively from structural-functionalist approach, exchange theory and dynamic conflict theory. Three aspects of the Common Cause politics are than closely examined and tested accordingly. On the other hand, the case for in-depth study is the anti-MX missile lobbying spearheaded by Common Cause during the Reagan years.
The first finding of this research is that the laissez-faire politics during the Reagan Years left Common Cause no choice but to shift its policy from good government issues to the anti-MX missile lobbying. The sudden shift to unfamiliarity confirms the first hypothesis that an interest group tends to change its policy goal when the environment becomes hostile. Another finding is that several designs that allow members more group participation helps enforce the cohesion and interest exchange in Common Cause. The hypothesis that entrepreneurs tend to provide group members purposive benefits is also confirmed by a questionnaire conducted by Common Cause. Finally, the extraordinary ambiguity that goes along MX missile agenda makes it possible for public interest groups to defeat a major weapons system that the White House wants to promote. The case confirms the third hypothesis that the more the ambiguity an agenda portrays, the better chance the agenda becomes amplified and intensified.
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