The analysis of cross ownership among affiliates enterprises

• Main Authors: An-ni Teng, 鄧安妮
• Other Authors: Yi-nan, Lin
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2000
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38652167301126383773

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 國際貿易學系 === 88 === There are two reasons leading to financial crisis of these enterprises. The remote cause is that the enterprises suffering from poor operation and loss were jeopardized by South East Asia financial crisis. The immediate cause is that the managers of the enterprises were deeply involved in stock market. These enterprises manipulated both their subsidiaries and strategically allied affiliates through interlocking of share holding to cook up the stock prices of specific companies. These actions were not only disturb the stability of security market but also enable the action takers to take control of the companies, abuse the resources, ruined the soundness of the healthy companies, and jeopardize the rights of share holders, creditors and investors. The government and competent authority related are obliged to regulate the issue of cross ownership to avoid similar crisis in the future. This thesis is consisted of three parts. The first part discusses the formation of affiliates and their management style. The second part analyzes the nature of affiliates, the fraud arising from interlocking of share among them, and the impact on domestic industry development. The third part analyzes the necessary measures should be taken by government in responding the fraud arising from cross ownership. It is hoped that the conclusion of this thesis will lead the enterprises to a sound and comprehensive management model. The findings of this thesis are as follows: 1. The causes of management style transformation from single enterprises to affiliates lie in economic, managerial, legal, and other factors. 2. There is a special relationship between affiliates. The fraud arises from the influences of one company upon another over the management and strategy decision making. For example, enterprises use irregular stock trading maneuvers to avoid taxes and transfer profits among themselves. The worst case would be the abuse of cross ownership strategy. It is true that, by implementing the cross ownership strategy, enterprise could improve operational efficiency, solidify management status, stabilize stock prices, and take control of operational funding sources. However, the down side would be capital over-state, the board members and supervisors staying in power, inside-trade, stock cooking-up, and drain off the company assets. The counter measures should be taken to prevent the above mentioned illegitimate operation or crime from happening. 3. For counter measurements in responding cross ownership were discussed in this thesis. They are the supervision of company management, the disclosure of affiliate status, the re of security market order, and strengthening the credit system of financial institutions. It is hoped that we can not only preserve the impartiality of security market but also protect the rights of share holder, creditors, and investors without affecting the development of domestic enterprises.