| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 哲學研究所 === 89 === In this thesis I show that Gadamer’s Truth and Method can be taken as a dialogue on the concept of truth in the hermeneutics of the human sciences. One party of this dialogue upholds the slogan of objective understanding (I call it the antithesis of this dialogue). Its main representatives are F. Schleiermacher, W. Dilthey and E. Hirsch. The other party, represented by H.G. Gadamer, advocates the concept of the logic of question and answer (I call it the thesis of this dialogue). Since the concept of objective understanding in the former party is already out of date, it makes this dialogue appears to be unintelligible to the present minds, therefore it is necessary to recover its contemporary sense.
In chapter one I try to raise the antithesis of this dialogue to a universal position that I call it “the model of interpretation based on the concept of substance prior to relation.” From this position I recover the contemporary sense of the antithesis and further indicate the difficulties involved in it. In chapter two I raise the thesis of this dialogue to another universal position that I call it “the model of interpretation based on the concept of relation prior to substance.” I then try to show how Gadamer attacks the antithesis of this dialogue. Chapter three shows that the climax of Gadamer’s model of interpretation is accomplished in his concept of the logic of question and answer. I am sure that my work here can retrieve the actuality of the dialogue implied in the Truth and Method.
Subject Cataloging: Hermeneutics, H.G. Gadamer, Logic of Question and Answer, Objective Understanding.
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