| Summary: | 碩士 === 靜宜大學 === 企業管理學系 === 89 === The purpose of this study is to investigate how the managers of Taiwan stock-listed company face the agency problems in financing selection. This study was designed further to examine weather the financing selection bring any stockholder’s wealth effect and what influential variables affect it. This study adapts Moral Hazard Theory (Jensen, 1986; Zwiebel, 1996), Adverse Selection Theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and Static Trade-Off Theory to examine the hypothesis respectively. The methodology for analyzing financing selections used Logistic Regression, for the stockholder’s wealth effect assessed by Event Study and Cross-sectional Analysis. The sample is the event of Taiwan stock-listed company, which announce equity offerings or corporate bond issue from 1996 to 1999. There is a total of 360 samples. The empirical results show that, financing selection of the managers consistent with “Moral Hazard Theory” and “Static Trade-Off Theory”. However, “Adverse Selection Theory” have a converse conclusion. Furthermore, we find the stockholder’s wealth effect of financing selections (equity offerings and corporate bond issue) did not reach a significant level. Moreover, we found that the “announcement effect”, based on the Adverse Selection Theory, was partly significant in the variables of reflecting the market.
|
|---|
