Purchase Guarantee and Loan Guarantee in BOT Concession Design─ The Case Study of Taiwan High Speed Railway Project

• Main Authors: WanYi Liu, 劉宛怡
• Other Authors: Zhang Dai-Cheng
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2001
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/72524333856936432076

碩士 === 東吳大學 === 國際貿易學系 === 89 === BOT(Build-Operate-Transfer) has became one of the commonly used strategy in constructing public facilities in many countries. In order to attract the private investment, policy makers usually consider the application of innovative policy instruments in BOT concession designs. However, NPV rule can not properly capture managerial flexibility to adapt and revise future decisions in response to unexpected market development. This thesis takes the Taiwan North-South High-Speed Railway Project (THSR) as a sample and develop the concept of the real option. We value purchase guarantee as a abandon option and loan guarantee as a European put option. Besides, the optimal abandon boundary could explain the decision of the concession company. The result shows expand NPV is 230 billion for the concession company and the value of loan guarantee for the bank is 0.42 billion, but the policy makers do not receive any premium. The policy makers made not only purchase guarantee but also loan guarantee could restrain the abandon opportunity of the concession company. Although the concession company might discontinue operating THSR, loan guarantee could lower the moral hazard. In other words, the policy makers made both purchase guarantee and loan guarantee is better than only purchase guarantee. According to the result of sensitive analysis, the value of abandon option depends on several factors, such as operating value and volatility of the construction. Generally speaking, the concession company will not abandon operating easily.