| Summary: | 碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 保險學系 === 90 === ABSTRACT
This study discusses how genetic technology affects the present life insurance underwriting process due to the information problem it may create, and how the asymmetric information problem can be mitigated.
Those who took the genetic exams, have the future disease risks, may most likely transfer their risks to the insurers. To account for the situation faced by insurers, this paper works on three dimensions.
First, we use Human Genome Project and Applera Corporation to illustrate the progress of the current genetics. We find that the improvement of genetic technology now is more and more likely enables human to predict their risk of future diseases. To illustrate, we then show the gene information can reveal the probability of getting disease, and the low cost nature of the tests.
Finally, to mitigate the asymmetric information problem, we suggest to establish a Gene Information Bureau (GIB) and/or to provide a menu of contract allowing self-selection to reduce such a problem.
We then show that with GIB, insurance underwriters could divide the proposed insureds into different risks groups, such as whether he/she took the genetic tests or whether he/she intends to hide his/her risks. On the other hand, this study suggests that while without GIB, or when the proposed insured tries to hide his/her risks, the underwriters may use options to make the proposed insured reveal his/her risks automatically.
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