Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan
碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系 === 90 === A distinguishing feature in Taiwan’s real estate brokerage industry is the coexistence of different payment regimes. In this paper, we analyze the choice of real estate brokers among various payment regimes empirically. In particular, we examine whether more able wo...
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ndltd-TW-090TKU003350082016-06-24T04:14:56Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62128339619039852640 Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan 薪獎制度與績效─台灣房屋仲介業的實證研究 Yu-ping Li 李玉平 碩士 淡江大學 產業經濟學系 90 A distinguishing feature in Taiwan’s real estate brokerage industry is the coexistence of different payment regimes. In this paper, we analyze the choice of real estate brokers among various payment regimes empirically. In particular, we examine whether more able workers choose firms with higher bonus rates. Besides the self-selection effect cited above, we examine the incentive effect of bonus rates on the performance of workers.A simple theoretical model is constructed and testable hypotheses are thus derived. We estimate a three-regime switching regression model by employing the data set collected ourselves. The empirical results show that bonus rates have significant effects on the performance of workers. In addition, workers with more experience tend to choose firms with higher bonus rates. The above results confirm the existence of self-selection effect and incentive effect. Ruoh-Rong Yu 于若蓉 2002 學位論文 ; thesis 50 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系 === 90 === A distinguishing feature in Taiwan’s real estate brokerage industry is the coexistence of different payment regimes. In this paper, we analyze the choice of real estate brokers among various payment regimes empirically. In particular, we examine whether more able workers choose firms with higher bonus rates. Besides the self-selection effect cited above, we examine the incentive effect of bonus rates on the performance of workers.A simple theoretical model is constructed and testable hypotheses are thus derived. We estimate a three-regime switching regression model by employing the data set collected ourselves. The empirical results show that bonus rates have significant effects on the performance of workers. In addition, workers with more experience tend to choose firms with higher bonus rates. The above results confirm the existence of self-selection effect and incentive effect.
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Ruoh-Rong Yu |
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Ruoh-Rong Yu Yu-ping Li 李玉平 |
author |
Yu-ping Li 李玉平 |
spellingShingle |
Yu-ping Li 李玉平 Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan |
author_sort |
Yu-ping Li |
title |
Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan |
title_short |
Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan |
title_full |
Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan |
title_fullStr |
Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan |
title_full_unstemmed |
Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan |
title_sort |
compensation policies and performance: empirical evidence from real-estate brokers in taiwan |
publishDate |
2002 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62128339619039852640 |
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