Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系 === 90 === A distinguishing feature in Taiwan’s real estate brokerage industry is the coexistence of different payment regimes. In this paper, we analyze the choice of real estate brokers among various payment regimes empirically. In particular, we examine whether more able wo...

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Main Authors: Yu-ping Li, 李玉平
Other Authors: Ruoh-Rong Yu
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2002
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62128339619039852640
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spelling ndltd-TW-090TKU003350082016-06-24T04:14:56Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62128339619039852640 Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan 薪獎制度與績效─台灣房屋仲介業的實證研究 Yu-ping Li 李玉平 碩士 淡江大學 產業經濟學系 90 A distinguishing feature in Taiwan’s real estate brokerage industry is the coexistence of different payment regimes. In this paper, we analyze the choice of real estate brokers among various payment regimes empirically. In particular, we examine whether more able workers choose firms with higher bonus rates. Besides the self-selection effect cited above, we examine the incentive effect of bonus rates on the performance of workers.A simple theoretical model is constructed and testable hypotheses are thus derived. We estimate a three-regime switching regression model by employing the data set collected ourselves. The empirical results show that bonus rates have significant effects on the performance of workers. In addition, workers with more experience tend to choose firms with higher bonus rates. The above results confirm the existence of self-selection effect and incentive effect. Ruoh-Rong Yu 于若蓉 2002 學位論文 ; thesis 50 zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系 === 90 === A distinguishing feature in Taiwan’s real estate brokerage industry is the coexistence of different payment regimes. In this paper, we analyze the choice of real estate brokers among various payment regimes empirically. In particular, we examine whether more able workers choose firms with higher bonus rates. Besides the self-selection effect cited above, we examine the incentive effect of bonus rates on the performance of workers.A simple theoretical model is constructed and testable hypotheses are thus derived. We estimate a three-regime switching regression model by employing the data set collected ourselves. The empirical results show that bonus rates have significant effects on the performance of workers. In addition, workers with more experience tend to choose firms with higher bonus rates. The above results confirm the existence of self-selection effect and incentive effect.
author2 Ruoh-Rong Yu
author_facet Ruoh-Rong Yu
Yu-ping Li
李玉平
author Yu-ping Li
李玉平
spellingShingle Yu-ping Li
李玉平
Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan
author_sort Yu-ping Li
title Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan
title_short Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan
title_full Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan
title_fullStr Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan
title_full_unstemmed Compensation Policies and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Real-Estate Brokers in Taiwan
title_sort compensation policies and performance: empirical evidence from real-estate brokers in taiwan
publishDate 2002
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62128339619039852640
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