The Political Economy of The Law of Subdivision of FinancialIncome and Expenditure

• Main Authors: Yu-Lien Lin, 林佑蓮
• Other Authors: Chian-Gui Jiang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2003
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/11717612291181933818

碩士 === 中原大學 === 國際貿易研究所 === 91 === In this paper, we establish a model of congressional voting behavior for the political economy of Taiwan. The purpose of this paper is to find out the factors, which influence on the congressional voting behavior in the disputant bills. In brief, we attempt to transform the exogenous form of a policy into an endogenous form. We use the probit model to estimate the congressional voting behavior in this paper and the empirical result shows that the party has a positive effect on the amendment of “The Law of Subdivision of Financial Income and Expenditure”. Besides, the industrial structure of population has a negative effect on the congressional voting behavior. Furthermore, we try to delete the data of the nationwide legislators, and then re-test the voting behavior of the regional legislators. We can find out the regional interests variables, which influence the voting behavior through the estimation of regional congressional voting behavior. According to this data, the empirical result shows that the tenure of legislators has a negative effect on the congressional voting behavior. Finally, form this study we can find that the party is the most important variable influence the congressional voting behavior in the political economy of Taiwan. In other words, the party plays a decisive role in the process of legislation.