The influence of corporate ownership structure upon the informativeness of earnings

碩士 === 中原大學 === 會計研究所 === 91 === Abstract Taiwan listed companys world competitive placed behind ,the main reasons are share ownership structure and informativeness transparency. According to foreign paper indicated ,even among America firms ,there is concentration of ownership too ;share ownership...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Shiou-Yuh Chang, 張秀玉
Other Authors: Jiu-Yang Jian
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2003
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/08686466091592561406
Description
Summary:碩士 === 中原大學 === 會計研究所 === 91 === Abstract Taiwan listed companys world competitive placed behind ,the main reasons are share ownership structure and informativeness transparency. According to foreign paper indicated ,even among America firms ,there is concentration of ownership too ;share ownership concentration is higher than others in East Asian, most of concentrated in families or the State ,which in formativeness transparency is lower .Domestic paper found that ,using the criterion that ultimate owner have control rights exceeding 20﹪as a cutoff to define each company’s ultimate control pattern ,more than a half of firms were controlled in families hands, which informativeness transparency is low too. The research by using Fan & Wong’s(2000)earnings-return relationship model, and adopting the method developed by La Porta et al.,(1999),traced the ultimate controller ,using the criterion that ultimate owner have control rights exceeding 20﹪as a cutoff to define each company’s ultimate control pattern ,to examine Taiwan listed companys controller’s voting rights and cash flow rights ,analysis to the influence of controller’s the degree of divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights upon the informativeness of earnings ,and considering ultimate controller are both family and enterprise groups ,whether effecting the informativeness of earnings .The results as follows: 1.All samples,ultimate controller is 39.89﹪for family control ;if comparison to different industries controller, the electronic industry only is 27﹪for family control ,the non- electronic industry is 57.53﹪for family control, it revealed technology industry is continuous developing ,the voting rights concentration is decreasing ,the result is consistent with Claessens et al.,(2000a)research. 2.The ultimate controller’s voting rights and the divergence of her cash flow rights and voting rights have a negative effect on the informativeness of earnings;ultimate controller are both family and enterprise groups,a negative effect on the informativeness of earnings.