| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 國際事務與戰略研究所 === 91 === Owing to the years of confrontation and separation and differences between ideologies cross Taiwan Strait, the cross-strait interactions are full of “conflict and cooperation”. As the cross-strait interactions increase, the conflicts from political opinions of the two sides tend to continually rise despite of the growing exchanges in non-political issues such as economic, trade, culture, education, and social affairs. As the political and economic powers of China gradually grow, it has created the agenda of “Chinese Threat”, and as the People’s Republic of China refuses to abandon the option of taking Taiwan by armed forces, the development of cross-straits relation is full of uncertainties. Therefore, in light of the intricate cross-strait relations and the armed forces threat from the PRC, the author discussed the influence of cross-strait status on the ROC military strategy evolution in the perspectives of major policies and changes in political, economic, and military interactions of the two sides between 1949 and 2000.This thesis adopts “peace and conflict database” and “secondary research” methodologies to investigate the index of cross-strait interaction, and explores the content of ROC military strategy evolution. It consists of seven chapters, in which the main body is composed by five chapters in addition to the introduction in the first chapter and the conclusion in the seventh chapter. Chapter two mainly discusses related theories of ROC military strategies, in the perspectives of strategy and strategic thinking development, the theoretical framework of military strategy, the planning activities of military strategies, and the considering factors of establishment. Chapter three studies the evolution of ROC military strategies, in terms of the cross-strait relation development and military strategy evolving processes, the analysis of ROC military strategy evolution and theory development, and the factors that affect the development of ROC military strategies. Chapter four focuses on the ROC military strategy evolution in the period of Chiang Kai-Sheck and the period of peaceful cross-strait confrontation (1949-1978), which discusses the cross-strait political interaction, economic and trade exchange, military threat, and military strategy activities. Chapter five studies the ROC military strategy evolution in the period of Chiang Ching-Kuo and the period of cross-strait civilian exchange and consultation (1979-1987), which discusses the cross-strait political interaction, economic and trade exchange, military threat, and military strategy activities. Chapter six discusses the ROC military strategy evolution in the period of Lee Teng-Hui and the period of cross-strait consultation and conflict (1987-2000), which discusses cross-strait political interaction, economic and trade exchange, military threat, and military strategy activities. It is expected to highlight that as the difference between the military powers across the straits is huge, in addition to compensate the quantitative shortage by quality advantage, the decision-makers of ROC should pay attention to the rise and fall of power of enemy, friendly country and the third party, and propose concrete policies, and adjust its military strategy accordingly and timely to adapt to the possible cross-strait confrontation.The facts disclosed in the thesis reveals that national security should be considered from threat, utilize both means of armed forces and non-armed forces to achieve the target of national security, which enabled the author to verify the hypotheses: “when the cross-strait relations in detente, the military strategy evolution of ROC shifts to defensive strategy; when the cross-strait relation in tenseness, the military strategy evolution of ROC shifts to deterring strategy. This research also discovers that the steadiness of cross-strait relations determines the surviving and development of ROC, and constructive interaction is the only factor that decides national and defense security. As to the strategic thinking of “ effective deterrence and defensive sustaining” can only elaborate the function of effective deterrence when overall consensus can be achieved; it further suggests that the future military strategy should be adjusted to “limited deterrence and active defense”, and adopt “the whole people defense” to counter the PRC’s asymmetrical warfare strategic thinking.
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