| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系 === 91 === The purpose of this thesis is to determine the effect of managerial ownership on corporate performance. There are many studies in the literature that trace the chain of ownership to find who has the most voting right, and to identify their ultimate control patterns. In particular, we view that the ownership structure of the firm should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of decisions reflecting the influence of profit-maximizing process by shareholders.
In order to understand whether the variation in ownership structure exists, this thesis applies the switching simultaneous equation model to detect the connection between ownership structure and performance. To highlight the sample selection bias caused by endogenous ownership structure, we adopt Heckman two-stage estimation procedures. In addition, taking the self selection among different regimes of ownership structure into account, we apply the simultaneous equation to estimate the relation between the ownership structure and the corporate performance.
The data were collected from the publications of the listed companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2001. We obtained 466 valid observations excluding some specific industries (e.g. financial industry and insurance companies etc.). According to empirical results, we find that after considering two variables of the business group and the family-controlled company, there exist important effects of self selection on ownership in different regimes. Besides, the change of managerial ownership has significant effect on the corporate performance as the ownership regime selection differs. This also indicates that the self selection among different regimes of ownership structure did affect the outcome of managerial ownership on the corporate performance.
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