| Summary: | 碩士 === 元智大學 === 資訊管理研究所 === 91 === Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) has placed Taiwan as a key role of global high-tech industry. However, our manufacturers were trapped in a game manipulated by international buyers’ strategic deployments for a long time. The buyers usually order a large amount of goods to a manufacturer this time, then turn to others when they have new requests. A phenomenon resulting from this gaming operation is excessively idle capacity facing most manufacturers, and consequently they have no power to bargain with the buyers. To mitigate this kind of disadvantageous situation, we propose that manufacturers should adopt a way of forming strategic alliance to play against the buyers’ manipulation. To members of the alliance, there is only single point-of-contact in handling orders from buyers. It is clear that how to fairly and reasonably allocate orders and profits will be important issues when forming a strategic alliance.
In this research, we focus on how to fairly allocate orders for an existing strategic alliance whose members can produce certain kinds of goods. Upon receiving a purchase request, the alliance will check whether this order can be promised, and determine how to split the order to each member. Based on each member’s past performance and expected growth rate, we first compute the percentage of the total amount of orders to be allocated to each member next year. Next, under constraints such as each member’s product price, quality and total capacity, etc., we tend to allocate the orders in pursuit of maximizing total profits and achieving the allocation equity. Furthermore, we are in an attempt to achieve the allocation equity reasonably through profit sharing; we take each member’s performance, profit contribution rate, and the difference rate between the promised and real allocated ratio this year into account in this stage. Finally, we illustrate the merits of our model through examples in consideration of different ordering situations.
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