The Effects of Corporate Goverance on CEO Turnover

• Main Authors: Yu-Wei Wang, 王育偉
• Other Authors: Han-Sheng Lei
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2004
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2w8tw8

碩士 === 朝陽科技大學 === 企業管理系碩士班 === 92 === Under the system of separating between ownership and management, managers could pursue their private interest at the expense of stockholders. How to mitigate the interest confliction has been a central issue in corporate governance, and dismissing manager with poor performance is a possible solution. Our paper examines the relationship between corporate performance and CEO turnover. Furthermore, we analyze the interaction effects of corporate performance and firm characteristics on CEO turnover. The results show that companies with poor performance would be more possible to replace their CEO. And we find that companies with higher growth opportunity, higher stockholding of directors and supervisors, and with outside directors are more likely to replace their manager when corporate performance was poor; companies with larger information asymmetry, higher stockholding of managers, the duality of board chair and CEO, or a family business are less likely to replace their CEO when manager’s performance was poor. Keywords: management turnover, outside director, family business, growth opportunity, information asymmetry