| Summary: | 碩士 === 佛光人文社會學院 === 政治學研究所 === 92 === Abstract
This research analyzes the case of Taiwan’s Forth Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP) from political and legal perspectives to explore why a sudden policy change occurs. It pays special attention to how political and legal institutions constrain decisionmaker and how to resolve FNPP disputes.
The major argument is that there is an interaction between the institutions and decisionmakers; thus, the institutions and decisionmaker are equally important in explaining policy change. The study intends to answer the following questions. First, how policy change is possible when the decisionmakers’ choice is inconsistent with the institution? Second, what are the options for decisionmaker in such a conflict situation? How dose the institutions constrain the choice of a decisionmaker?
This paper adopts rational choice institutionalism from the school of new institutionalism, and applies ‘strategic interaction’ to discuss the process of policy change. This research argues that the decisionmaker can only optimize his interests by changing a policy under the constraint of legal institutions. However, if the decision-maker ignores the constraint of institutions and only pursuits his own political interests, the transaction cost of policy change will be tremendous.
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