| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 會計研究所 === 92 === In America, the audit profession contends legal practices treat auditors unfairly. Until recently, they have been held jointly and severally liable for undetected material misstatements and have had to pay their own legal fees whether or not they prevail in court. Hence, they have asked for proportionate liability regime in decades and have got some success. A primary concern about proportionate liability is its potential effects on stockholders. Opponents claim that proportionate liability would decrease investor protection when managers are bankrupt due to the reduction in compensatory payments from auditors. Until now, this controversy still exists. To understand how auditor’s legal liability affects audit failure, this study focuses on the impacts of auditor’s legal liability on management fraud and audit effort.
Based on Patterson and Wright (2003) analytical model, this study investigates the effectiveness of proportionate liability in reducing the amount of management fraud and the audit failure rate relative to joint and several liability in two strategic audit settings: one that audit quality is affected by audit effort and one that audit quality is affected by both audit effort and the amount of management fraud.
My results show that a proportionate liability rule with large marginal liability relief for audit quality can effectively decrease the amount of management fraud and the audit failure rate relative to joint and several liability in both strategic audit settings. This result would provide valuable reference in auditor’s legal liability determination for policy-makers and regulators.
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