The Measurement of 「M+1 Rule」in Multimember Districts：The case of the 1998 and 2001 Legislative Elections

• Main Authors: Hui-Chen Ko, 柯惠真
• Other Authors: Ding-Ming Wang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2004
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/39241610849457071346

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 政治經濟學研究所 === 92 === 　　On the basis of Duverger's Law, Gary Cox proposed the "M+1 Rule", which explains the votes will concentrate on competitive “M+1” candidates. Due to voters’ insufficient information in multimember districts, the strategy voting is not obviously shown going to the "M+1" candidates. This outcome does not mean the “M+1 Rule” unable to apply in multimember districts. It also represents that the voter's strategy voting depends on the political party. Although used SF Ratio for measuring the strategy voting, Cox still can not measure the vote equalization and voter's strategy voting for the inter-party or intra-party ballot shift. Therefore, the aim of this research will adopt the measure of the modification of the SF Ratio. Additionally, new model id also created to analyze the vote equalization and ballot shift in the periods of 1998 and 2001 for Taiwan’s Elections. 　　This research finds that the ballot certainty transfers in the same political party candidates, which means that several main political parties have manipulated vote equalization. Besides primary factor for and the influence strategy voting is the magnitude of electoral district and the competition degree of election. Finally, the nomination and vote equalization of the DPP have gained whips in two sessions of legislation elections. Relatively, the KMT and the NP have gradually lost whips.