Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學研究所 === 92 === In this study we use three controlling proxies as the power to control a firm:CR (cash flow right), bias A (voting right minus cash flow right) and bias B( percentage in board of directors the ultimate controlling shareholder occupied minus cash flow right) to t...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Other Authors: | |
Format: | Others |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
2004
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93137187293234642400 |
id |
ndltd-TW-092NTU05304007 |
---|---|
record_format |
oai_dc |
spelling |
ndltd-TW-092NTU053040072016-06-10T04:15:42Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93137187293234642400 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 公司治理與盈餘管理 Wei-wen Sang 桑蔚文 碩士 國立臺灣大學 財務金融學研究所 92 In this study we use three controlling proxies as the power to control a firm:CR (cash flow right), bias A (voting right minus cash flow right) and bias B( percentage in board of directors the ultimate controlling shareholder occupied minus cash flow right) to test the relation between corporate governance and earnings management in Taiwan. We find that among three of the controlling proxies, only Bias B has consistent result. After dealing with Bias A by ranking, we can also find significantly positive relation. But CR is not significant in all conditions. Therefore we can conclude that, first, firms with larger bias B tend to have higher earnings management. Second, in Taiwan, bias B is more effective than bias A and cash flow right in detecting possible earnings management. Tsun-Siou Lee 李存修 2004 學位論文 ; thesis 33 en_US |
collection |
NDLTD |
language |
en_US |
format |
Others
|
sources |
NDLTD |
description |
碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學研究所 === 92 === In this study we use three controlling proxies as the power to control a firm:CR (cash flow right), bias A (voting right minus cash flow right) and bias B( percentage in board of directors the ultimate controlling shareholder occupied minus cash flow right) to test the relation between corporate governance and earnings management in Taiwan. We find that among three of the controlling proxies, only Bias B has consistent result. After dealing with Bias A by ranking, we can also find significantly positive relation. But CR is not significant in all conditions. Therefore we can conclude that, first, firms with larger bias B tend to have higher earnings management. Second, in Taiwan, bias B is more effective than bias A and cash flow right in detecting possible earnings management.
|
author2 |
Tsun-Siou Lee |
author_facet |
Tsun-Siou Lee Wei-wen Sang 桑蔚文 |
author |
Wei-wen Sang 桑蔚文 |
spellingShingle |
Wei-wen Sang 桑蔚文 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management |
author_sort |
Wei-wen Sang |
title |
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management |
title_short |
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management |
title_full |
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management |
title_fullStr |
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management |
title_full_unstemmed |
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management |
title_sort |
corporate governance and earnings management |
publishDate |
2004 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93137187293234642400 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT weiwensang corporategovernanceandearningsmanagement AT sāngwèiwén corporategovernanceandearningsmanagement AT weiwensang gōngsīzhìlǐyǔyíngyúguǎnlǐ AT sāngwèiwén gōngsīzhìlǐyǔyíngyúguǎnlǐ |
_version_ |
1718299820800606208 |