Corporate Governance and Earnings Management

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學研究所 === 92 === In this study we use three controlling proxies as the power to control a firm:CR (cash flow right), bias A (voting right minus cash flow right) and bias B( percentage in board of directors the ultimate controlling shareholder occupied minus cash flow right) to t...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Wei-wen Sang, 桑蔚文
Other Authors: Tsun-Siou Lee
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2004
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93137187293234642400
id ndltd-TW-092NTU05304007
record_format oai_dc
spelling ndltd-TW-092NTU053040072016-06-10T04:15:42Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93137187293234642400 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 公司治理與盈餘管理 Wei-wen Sang 桑蔚文 碩士 國立臺灣大學 財務金融學研究所 92 In this study we use three controlling proxies as the power to control a firm:CR (cash flow right), bias A (voting right minus cash flow right) and bias B( percentage in board of directors the ultimate controlling shareholder occupied minus cash flow right) to test the relation between corporate governance and earnings management in Taiwan. We find that among three of the controlling proxies, only Bias B has consistent result. After dealing with Bias A by ranking, we can also find significantly positive relation. But CR is not significant in all conditions. Therefore we can conclude that, first, firms with larger bias B tend to have higher earnings management. Second, in Taiwan, bias B is more effective than bias A and cash flow right in detecting possible earnings management. Tsun-Siou Lee 李存修 2004 學位論文 ; thesis 33 en_US
collection NDLTD
language en_US
format Others
sources NDLTD
description 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學研究所 === 92 === In this study we use three controlling proxies as the power to control a firm:CR (cash flow right), bias A (voting right minus cash flow right) and bias B( percentage in board of directors the ultimate controlling shareholder occupied minus cash flow right) to test the relation between corporate governance and earnings management in Taiwan. We find that among three of the controlling proxies, only Bias B has consistent result. After dealing with Bias A by ranking, we can also find significantly positive relation. But CR is not significant in all conditions. Therefore we can conclude that, first, firms with larger bias B tend to have higher earnings management. Second, in Taiwan, bias B is more effective than bias A and cash flow right in detecting possible earnings management.
author2 Tsun-Siou Lee
author_facet Tsun-Siou Lee
Wei-wen Sang
桑蔚文
author Wei-wen Sang
桑蔚文
spellingShingle Wei-wen Sang
桑蔚文
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
author_sort Wei-wen Sang
title Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
title_short Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
title_full Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
title_fullStr Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
title_full_unstemmed Corporate Governance and Earnings Management
title_sort corporate governance and earnings management
publishDate 2004
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93137187293234642400
work_keys_str_mv AT weiwensang corporategovernanceandearningsmanagement
AT sāngwèiwén corporategovernanceandearningsmanagement
AT weiwensang gōngsīzhìlǐyǔyíngyúguǎnlǐ
AT sāngwèiwén gōngsīzhìlǐyǔyíngyúguǎnlǐ
_version_ 1718299820800606208