A Study on the Impact of the Proportion of Employees'' Bounses and the Boards'' Compensations to Earnings Distributed on Firm''s Performance

• Main Authors: Chun-Yei Sue, 蘇純儀
• Other Authors: Yang, Meng-Ping
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2004
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/11830820561026227074

碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 93 === Abstract If the firm has earnings in the year-end, reasonably its shareholders should have the rights to share all the earnings. In accordance with Company Law, earnings could be distributed to three kind of person, including employees, the board and shareholders. The boards’ compensations are for firms to reward the board which took great efforts in the last year. The employees’ bonuses are for firms to connect employees’ income with its profit through profit sharing plan. Employees’ bonuses can be paid in cash, stock or the combination of these two types. Especially, the market value of stock is several times higher than its par value. This study confers the impact of the amount of stock bonuses on firm’s performance. According to Company Law, employees, the board and shareholders all have rights to share earnings. So, when employees and the board measure their rewards, they not only care about the absolute amount of what they get, but also the relative amount. The relative amount means that the proportion of employees’ bonuses and the boards’ compensations to earnings distributed. So this study confers to catch the complete motivation effect of employees’ bonuses and the boards’ compensations, not only take the absolute amount into account, but also the relative amount. Samples of this study are Taiwan’s listed firms, which have earnings distributed financial information in continuous five years from 1998 to 2002. This study confers whether stock bonuses have more effect on firm’s performance than cash bonuses, and the impact of the proportion of employees’ bonuses and the boards’ compensations to earnings distributed on firm’s performance. This study takes the view of「a long period」, and tests our hypotheses with statistic variables of 5 years average. The empirical results can be summarized as follows： 1. Employee stock bonuses don’t induce the better performance than employee cash bonuses. Employee stock bonuses cause the negative impact on firm’s performance. 2. The proportion of employees’ bonuses and the boards’ compensations to earnings distributed really induce the better firm’s performance.