| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系 === 92 === The purpose of this thesis is to examine the determinants of the types of CEO selection while replacing CEOs. In the literature, most studies of the CEO turnover refer to the relationship between corporation performance and the probability of CEO turnover, and only a few studies focus on the types of CEO selection. Therefore, we emphasize on the decisive factors for the board to select a suitable manager under kinds of CEO replacing situations, whether to choose a family manager for fewer agent problems or to choose a professional manager with better capabilities. Because we are interested in the problem of the choice of CEO, the sample consists of the corporations in which the CEO turnover actually happens. We aim at the change of the types of CEO turnover and investigate the effects of various factors on that change.
The data are collected from the listed companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2002. We obtain 262 valid observations excluding financial companies. Several hypotheses relating the choice of the types of CEO to the agency cost, the manager’s ability, and the board structure are developed. Using the Probit econometric model, we find strong evidence to support proposed hypotheses. For further analyses, the sample is divided into different groups according to (1) the types of CEO before replacement, (2) the changes of EBIT before replacement, and (3) the industries. Regression results suggest that the effects of most variables on the choice of the types of CEO do vary across different subsamples.
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