The Study on the Relationship between the Stock Holding Ratio of Directors & Supervisors or Foreign Invests or Government and Financial Holding Company Performance.

• Main Authors: Hsieh Shih-Wei, 謝士偉
• Other Authors: 蔡偉澎
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/12116306599288079518

碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融研究所 === 93 === The study is to discuss the relationship between stock holding ratio of directors & supervisors、foreign investors、government for Taiwan Financial Holding Company. The studying data range is from 2002 to 2004 of Taiwan Financial Holding Companys’（FHC） annual reports. Using simple linear regression and statistics to analyse datas. Then the conclusion of the relationship between the stock holding ratio of directors & supervisors、foreign investors、government and FHC performance is not outstanding. The perhaps three reasons are as following： 一、For Taiwan FHC “Convergence of Interest Hypothesis“ doesn’t appear. If directors & supervisors hold more stock right, directors & supervisors expenditure partiality behavior will cause the losing of enterprise wealth that is taken by directors & supervisors. But it must not let performance promoted and value increased. The stock rights are more gathered up then it must not bring positive effect for value and performance of FHC. 二、Because of FHC rich capital assets and financial leverage operation it causes agency problem. The real investment of directors & supervisors are too low. And financial institution of financial leverage operation is so high. It easily causes “agency problem”. 三、The effect of stock rights diluting causes FHC enormous stock rights that become more opposite dispersing. Then it dilutes the relationship of FHC performance and stock holding ratio of directors & supervisors、foreign investors、government.