Accruals, Cash flow,and CEO Compensation-An Empirical Study
碩士 === 銘傳大學 === 會計學系碩士班 === 93 === Earning persistence is the key for a company with a concept of perpetual operation. This study uses the multiple regressions to investigate it. The results are as follows:when companies stay in the low earning persistence, the cash compensation will have a positive...
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ndltd-TW-093MCU053850082018-04-14T04:22:44Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/awdzfy Accruals, Cash flow,and CEO Compensation-An Empirical Study 應計項目及現金流量與公司經理人獎酬之關連性研究 Tung-Yu Hsu 徐同郁 碩士 銘傳大學 會計學系碩士班 93 Earning persistence is the key for a company with a concept of perpetual operation. This study uses the multiple regressions to investigate it. The results are as follows:when companies stay in the low earning persistence, the cash compensation will have a positive relationship with the cash flow from the operation;when companies stay in the high earning persistence, the stock compensation will have a positive relationship with the stock price. It means that when the companies stay in the different earning persistence. Since the compensation structure is different; therefore, the standard that companies evaluate the performance of the CEO is different. In addition, when the companies prefer higher proportion of short-term incentive compensation in total compensation, the CEO’s cash compensation will have positive relationships with the change of the accounts receivable and accounts payable;When the companies prefer higher proportion of long-term incentive compensation in total compensation, the CEO’s stock compensation will have positive relationships with the depreciation and amortization expense. It means if the companies prefer the short-term incentive compensation, the CEO wills have the incentive to manipulate the accruals to reach the target compensation. On the other hand, if the companies prefer the long-term incentive compensation, the CEO will think highly of long-term profitability and performance, and reduce the incentive for the CEOs to manipulate short-term earning. Chen-Huan Shieh Ming-Lei Chang 謝振環 張敏蕾 2005 學位論文 ; thesis 72 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 銘傳大學 === 會計學系碩士班 === 93 === Earning persistence is the key for a company with a concept of perpetual operation. This study uses the multiple regressions to investigate it. The results are as follows:when companies stay in the low earning persistence, the cash compensation will have a positive relationship with the cash flow from the operation;when companies stay in the high earning persistence, the stock compensation will have a positive relationship with the stock price. It means that when the companies stay in the different earning persistence. Since the compensation structure is different; therefore, the standard that companies evaluate the performance of the CEO is different.
In addition, when the companies prefer higher proportion of short-term incentive compensation in total compensation, the CEO’s cash compensation will have positive relationships with the change of the accounts receivable and accounts payable;When the companies prefer higher proportion of long-term incentive compensation in total compensation, the CEO’s stock compensation will have positive relationships with the depreciation and amortization expense. It means if the companies prefer the short-term incentive compensation, the CEO wills have the incentive to manipulate the accruals to reach the target compensation. On the other hand, if the companies prefer the long-term incentive compensation, the CEO will think highly of long-term profitability and performance, and reduce the incentive for the CEOs to manipulate short-term earning.
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author2 |
Chen-Huan Shieh |
author_facet |
Chen-Huan Shieh Tung-Yu Hsu 徐同郁 |
author |
Tung-Yu Hsu 徐同郁 |
spellingShingle |
Tung-Yu Hsu 徐同郁 Accruals, Cash flow,and CEO Compensation-An Empirical Study |
author_sort |
Tung-Yu Hsu |
title |
Accruals, Cash flow,and CEO Compensation-An Empirical Study |
title_short |
Accruals, Cash flow,and CEO Compensation-An Empirical Study |
title_full |
Accruals, Cash flow,and CEO Compensation-An Empirical Study |
title_fullStr |
Accruals, Cash flow,and CEO Compensation-An Empirical Study |
title_full_unstemmed |
Accruals, Cash flow,and CEO Compensation-An Empirical Study |
title_sort |
accruals, cash flow,and ceo compensation-an empirical study |
publishDate |
2005 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/awdzfy |
work_keys_str_mv |
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