The Relationship Between Corporate Excess Cash and Proxy Fight
碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 國際經濟研究所 === 93 === Takeover market is often suggested as ideal for containing the agency problem of corporate free cash flow. Faleye (2004) focused on the takeover-deterrence effects of excess cash and suggested the proxy contest as an effective control mechanism for addressing the...
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ndltd-TW-093NDHU53240282016-06-06T04:11:19Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/03855415338710253748 The Relationship Between Corporate Excess Cash and Proxy Fight 超額現金與委託書爭奪戰之關係 Chih-Chun Yang 楊智鈞 碩士 國立東華大學 國際經濟研究所 93 Takeover market is often suggested as ideal for containing the agency problem of corporate free cash flow. Faleye (2004) focused on the takeover-deterrence effects of excess cash and suggested the proxy contest as an effective control mechanism for addressing the agency problems of excessive corporate liquidity. I find that the probability of proxy fight is significantly increasing in excess cash holding of positive object, but significantly decreasing of negative object due to takeover-deterrence effects of corporate liquidity. Proxy fight announcement return is positive. The result may be explained to follow the news of proxy fight or in terms of insider’s information, but not related to excess cash. Following a proxy contest, executive turnover increases and target firms face to corporate restructuring or force to dispose of land. Furthermore, cash holdings decline following a proxy contest. This is not due to increase cash distributions to shareholder. Instead, management wastes it or fights against dissidents. So market/book ratio declines after a proxy contest. Investors don’t anticipate the proxy contest is an effect control mechanism and wealth-increasing effects. Tung-He Li 李同龢 2005 學位論文 ; thesis 47 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 國際經濟研究所 === 93 === Takeover market is often suggested as ideal for containing the agency problem of corporate free cash flow. Faleye (2004) focused on the takeover-deterrence effects of excess cash and suggested the proxy contest as an effective control mechanism for addressing the agency problems of excessive corporate liquidity.
I find that the probability of proxy fight is significantly increasing in excess cash holding of positive object, but significantly decreasing of negative object due to takeover-deterrence effects of corporate liquidity. Proxy fight announcement return is positive. The result may be explained to follow the news of proxy fight or in terms of insider’s information, but not related to excess cash. Following a proxy contest, executive turnover increases and target firms face to corporate restructuring or force to dispose of land. Furthermore, cash holdings decline following a proxy contest. This is not due to increase cash distributions to shareholder. Instead, management wastes it or fights against dissidents. So market/book ratio declines after a proxy contest. Investors don’t anticipate the proxy contest is an effect control mechanism and wealth-increasing effects.
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author2 |
Tung-He Li |
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Tung-He Li Chih-Chun Yang 楊智鈞 |
author |
Chih-Chun Yang 楊智鈞 |
spellingShingle |
Chih-Chun Yang 楊智鈞 The Relationship Between Corporate Excess Cash and Proxy Fight |
author_sort |
Chih-Chun Yang |
title |
The Relationship Between Corporate Excess Cash and Proxy Fight |
title_short |
The Relationship Between Corporate Excess Cash and Proxy Fight |
title_full |
The Relationship Between Corporate Excess Cash and Proxy Fight |
title_fullStr |
The Relationship Between Corporate Excess Cash and Proxy Fight |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Relationship Between Corporate Excess Cash and Proxy Fight |
title_sort |
relationship between corporate excess cash and proxy fight |
publishDate |
2005 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/03855415338710253748 |
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