| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 經濟學系 === 93 === After many developed countries release the ban of cross-selling in bank industries, the functions of banks in the economy changes from financial intermediations to financial department stores. The modern banks compete not only in the interest rates, but also in the branches and financial innovations. Therefore, the quality and the numbers of branches become as important considerations to attract the consumers, especially in some competitive markets. However, most of the literature focused on the interest rate decision. Although some studies have discussed the quality of service of banks, but there are very limited studies which have emphasized on the decisions of branches of banks.
This thesis attempts to establish a theoretical model to analyze the competition of branches of banks and the influences of the number of branches to the quality of service of branches and interest decisions as well. In particular, the theory provided in this study provide the optimal decisions for the number of branches. Morevoer, potential empirical implications are also discussed.
The main conclusions from the theoretical analysis are as follows. It finds that because the increasing of branches can attract more consumers, an increase in the number of branches shall increase the expected revenues, but also leads to partial over-competition, causing a negative effect on attract consumers. Therefore, there exists an optimal finite number of branches. In addition, the equilibrium deposit interest rates and financial service qualities are also affected by the number of branches.
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