A Study of Agency Relationships in Public Institutions that Entrusts Professional Construction Management

• Main Authors: Jing-Yueh Chang, 張敬岳
• Other Authors: 曾惠斌
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/59361781002169287573

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 土木工程學研究所 === 93 === According to the Government Procurement Act, the public institutions could entrust Professional Construction Management to provide professional services if they are incapable. Consequently, the agency relationship is existed between the public institutions and Professional Construction Management. However, problems arise in agency relationships, since the agent does not always prefer to take the action that the principal most prefers. Due to the information asymmetry and interest conflict between principals and agents, agents may take many actions that are not favored by principals. Such actions include shirking, self-interested behavior, collusion to cheat owner, etc. For this reason, this study is trying to analyze the agency problems and figuring out the way to deal whit the situations. This study is standing in the side of public institutions and applying the Agent theory to analyze the problems existing in the principal-agent relationship. Then, the main objective of this study is to create a model by evaluating the different degrees of information asymmetry and goal conflict to identify the order of severity of agency problems between public institutions and Professional Construction Management.