董事會屬性、平衡計分卡與企業營運績效之關聯性

• Main Authors: Man-Jung Hsu, 許嫚戎
• Other Authors: 杜榮瑞
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/18481752524374285128

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 93 === Extant research on the relationship between board of directors and corporate performance yields mixed findings. The inconsistent findings may be due to the lack of consideration of interactive effects among corporate control mechanisms. Board of directors is largely responsible for the formulation of corporate objectives, missions, and strategies. An effective corporate control system, however, also requires enforceable implementation of the strategies. The balanced scorecard (BSC) has been suggested as an enforceable control mechanism for strategy implementation. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the interactive effect of board of directors and balanced scorecard implementation on corporate performance. Chief financial officers (CFOs) of listed companies in Taiwan are solicited to respond to the questionnaire on the degree of BSC implementation in their companies. The data for the other variables are collected from Taiwan Economic Journal database. The results based on 78 useful responses are as follows: 1. The interaction between board size and BSC implementation has a significant and positive effect on corporate performance. 2.There is no significant interactive effect between independent directors (in terms of absolute number of independent directors and relative proportion of independent directors) and BSC implementation on corporate performance. 3.There is a significant and positive interactive effect between accounting expertise of independent directors and BSC implementation on corporate performance. 4.There is no significant interactive effect between general management expertise of independent directors and BSC implementation on corporate performance. In summary, the findings indicate that the interactions between board size and accounting expertise of independent directors, on the one hand, and BSC implementation, on the other hand, have significant and positive effects on corporate performance. Implications and limitations are offered.