| Summary: | 碩士 === 世新大學 === 經濟學研究所(含碩專班) === 93 === The paper studies the phenomena of tax competition among Taiwan’s local jurisdictions, we calculate two kinds of real land tax rate respectively according to the land tax and the land increment duty data, and using the spatial econometric approach to compare the fitness of tax competition model. The research discovers that the ratio of announced rent value over market price as the proxy tax rate suggests the essence of spatial relationship (spatial auto-correlation), simultaneously the substantive spatial lag model contribute to the strategic correlation of tax rate setting among local jurisdictions; besides, the estimated coefficient of tax reaction function of this research is 0.316, which is also close to the estimated results in the literature. In addition, after expanding the definition of spatial neighboring, we find tax reaction effect is weaken that shows direct neighbors being able to affect local tax behavior better than indirect neighbors. Moreover, by linking the elected mayor's votes from campaign and real land tax rate in local jurisdictions, this paper also attempts to examine the original reason for Taiwan’s local tax competition with public choice theory.
|
|---|
