| Summary: | 碩士 === 東海大學 === 國際貿易學系 === 93 === The purpose of this research is to include the R&D diminishing return and product differentiation into the cournot competition of the vertical integration, and R&D cooperation. We conclude the probably competition procedure as following: in the beginning, when the down stream firms are independent and without any strategic integration or cooperation, the down stream firms’ integration with upstream firm could bring higher profit. The first one to anticipate each other to integrate with upstream firm can obtain the higher profit, the others will suffer the loose of profit. So, it’s very possible to turn up the double integration industry structure. Under the consideration of profit, to cooperate with the integrated firm is better than integrated with the other upstream firm. In the other way, under the condition of double integration, it could improve down streams’ profit if one of the downstream firms give up integration and cooperate with the other. But the firm give up to integrate would suffer a lower profit than the other downstream firm. Thus the negotiation of downstream firms is pretty important.
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