| Summary: | 碩士 === 元智大學 === 管理研究所 === 93 === According to the past study, a high degree connection is founded between service bonuses distribution and operating performance. Operating performance originates service quantity and the price of the benefit. When the price factor is a constant, in creating the principle of the high performance, operating result representative directors or groups have to carry on the control from quantity. Therefore, the hospital will control, being ordering most beneficially, and the ideal of Taiwan’s national health insurance system “integrating medical treatment resource and promoting human being health welfare” is no longer existed.
Our study applies simulation techniques to understand whether doctor is subject to the health insurance medical treatment global budget payment system’s influence or not; whether hospital management and doctor’s medical service being influenced on the maximum profit strategy. To get much of rewards, doctors will match with the hospital’s control strategy of global budget payment system or maximum service, which have to change the habits of medical treatment examined or the times of patients going for doctor.
Empirical results indicate as followings:
In the first place, doctors will match with global budget payment system which changes the medical treatment conduct, increases or decreases the times of patients going for doctor. One of the reasons is Information dissymmetry between producer (hospital) and consumer (patient), for instance, patient request doctor, doctor’s profession thinks the patient need service, the disease category changing, policy factor and so on.
In the second place, the benefit, in global budget payment system, that the hospital acquires is less than original system. The times of medical treatment obviously decrease. Under the decrease of global budget payment, the doctor’s reward also decreased, and the range of the former is greater than the latter.
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