| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中央大學 === 資訊工程研究所 === 94 === The security of classical cryptography depends on the difficult mathematical problems. However, when physical security is proposed, many researchers turn their attention to the implementations of cryptosystems, and related attacks and corre-sponding countermeasures are also proposed. In many public-key cryptosystems,
modular exponentiation is the main operation. Hence, the physical cryptanalysis about public-key cryptosystems always focus on modular exponentiation algorithm.
In this thesis, firstly, both techniques of multi-exponentiation and side-channel atomicity are employed to propose a more efficient exponentiation countermeasure. The proposed countermeasure can resist against SPA and DPA at the same time, and we also notice that the proposed countermeasure can be free from well known C safe-error attack.
According to related lectures, some countermeasures are still controversial and
insecure in advanced physical attacks. Hence, we point out one of the existent countermeasure is still insecure by the proposed new power analysis. In this thesis, we propose a new power analysis against left-to-right Ha-Moon's countermeasure which is based on a randomized binary signed digit representation to resist against differential power analysis.
|
|---|
