| Summary: | 碩士 === 中原大學 === 會計研究所 === 95 === In the past, director compensation in studies is mostly emphasized on its relationship with company’s performance, but less on earnings management or information transparency. In this research, we begin with model one to investigate the connection between director compensation and earnings management. As the result shows, the more the director compensation are, the deeper the directors of board would be involved in earnings management. Further tests are conducted to see the influence on discretionary accruals when the director compensation in family controlled firms is on different levels. It also shows that the family controlled firms, contrast to those non-family controlled, may acquire less payment, but still they involves deeper in earnings management than those non-family controlled do.
Model two is conducted to study the relationship between information transparency, from the Securities and Futures Institute, and director compensation. The result indicates that there is no significant connection between both. However, the information transparency indeed becomes lower when the information comes from family controlled firms rather than non-family controlled ones. Especially, when more director compensation is acquired in a family controlled firm, the information transparency will much drop down.
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