Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy -Long Term Evidence from Taiwan
碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融研究所 === 95 === There is an agency problem between control shareholders and minority shareholders because the ownership structure is concentrated and the board of director is control by family in the Taiwan Listed business group. The essay took advantage of the Taiwan Listed busines...
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ndltd-TW-095FJU002140142015-10-13T16:46:02Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29958681435207479339 Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy -Long Term Evidence from Taiwan 公司治理與股利政策-長期驗證 Hsu I-Chi 許逸驥 碩士 輔仁大學 金融研究所 95 There is an agency problem between control shareholders and minority shareholders because the ownership structure is concentrated and the board of director is control by family in the Taiwan Listed business group. The essay took advantage of the Taiwan Listed business group’s data to prove the long term relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy. The result shows that those companies with bad corporate governance and high agency problem will pay more dividends compared to those with good governance and low agency problem. The result indicates that dividends as a vehicle to reduce agency problem between control shareholders and minority shareholders. That is the payment of dividends exposes companies to capital markets in the future when they have to raise external funds and hence give external market an opportunity to monitor the inside operating and reduce company free cash flow. The result also indicates that in order to get external funds, company should build up a reputation for not expropriation from minority shareholders by paying dividends. Specially, when control shareholders’ cash flow rights are increasing above average, that is corporate governance better than others, the companies with high control shareholders’ cash flow rights didn’t build up a reputation for not expropriation from minority shareholders by paying dividends. Therefore, if company could operate dividend policy effectively, it could build up a reputation for not expropriation from minority shareholders. And then company could strive to create firm’s value and maximize shareholders’ wealth. Yeh Yin-Hua 葉銀華 2007 學位論文 ; thesis 75 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 金融研究所 === 95 === There is an agency problem between control shareholders and minority shareholders because the ownership structure is concentrated and the board of director is control by family in the Taiwan Listed business group. The essay took advantage of the Taiwan Listed business group’s data to prove the long term relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy. The result shows that those companies with bad corporate governance and high agency problem will pay more dividends compared to those with good governance and low agency problem.
The result indicates that dividends as a vehicle to reduce agency problem between control shareholders and minority shareholders. That is the payment of dividends exposes companies to capital markets in the future when they have to raise external funds and hence give external market an opportunity to monitor the inside operating and reduce company free cash flow. The result also indicates that in order to get external funds, company should build up a reputation for not expropriation from minority shareholders by paying dividends.
Specially, when control shareholders’ cash flow rights are increasing above average, that is corporate governance better than others, the companies with high control shareholders’ cash flow rights didn’t build up a reputation for not expropriation from minority shareholders by paying dividends.
Therefore, if company could operate dividend policy effectively, it could build up a reputation for not expropriation from minority shareholders. And then company could strive to create firm’s value and maximize shareholders’ wealth.
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author2 |
Yeh Yin-Hua |
author_facet |
Yeh Yin-Hua Hsu I-Chi 許逸驥 |
author |
Hsu I-Chi 許逸驥 |
spellingShingle |
Hsu I-Chi 許逸驥 Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy -Long Term Evidence from Taiwan |
author_sort |
Hsu I-Chi |
title |
Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy -Long Term Evidence from Taiwan |
title_short |
Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy -Long Term Evidence from Taiwan |
title_full |
Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy -Long Term Evidence from Taiwan |
title_fullStr |
Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy -Long Term Evidence from Taiwan |
title_full_unstemmed |
Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy -Long Term Evidence from Taiwan |
title_sort |
corporate governance and dividend policy -long term evidence from taiwan |
publishDate |
2007 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29958681435207479339 |
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AT hsuichi corporategovernanceanddividendpolicylongtermevidencefromtaiwan AT xǔyìjì corporategovernanceanddividendpolicylongtermevidencefromtaiwan AT hsuichi gōngsīzhìlǐyǔgǔlìzhèngcèzhǎngqīyànzhèng AT xǔyìjì gōngsīzhìlǐyǔgǔlìzhèngcèzhǎngqīyànzhèng |
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