The Low-Balling behavior’s influence on NO-Audit Fee and on Independence of Auditor in Taiwan.
碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 會計學系碩士班 === 95 === The paper discusses whether low-balling will impair auditor’s independence. In addition, The study tests how the investors respond to the signal of low-balling. The study takes example of 489 public companies which disclose audit fee information .The test period is...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2007
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67574689879196123147 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 會計學系碩士班 === 95 === The paper discusses whether low-balling will impair auditor’s independence. In addition, The study tests how the investors respond to the signal of low-balling.
The study takes example of 489 public companies which disclose audit fee information .The test period is from 2003 to 2005; The study uses modified Jones model (Dechow 1995) to estimate discretionary-accruals as the proxy of auditors independence and examination the relationship between auditors independence and low-balling; Experiencing the relation between abnormal-return represented the response of investor with low-balling data were disclosed. In this study of market reaction, we use abnormal-return as dependent variable.
The results reveal that low-balling will not impair auditor’s independence; There is a negative association between the low-balling signal and reaction of the market.
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