A Multiple-Round Compromising Coordination Mechanism for Single-Period Products in Supply Chains with Single Supplier and Multiple Buyers

• Main Authors: Chih-hsuan Chuang, 莊志軒
• Other Authors: Yeu-shiang Huang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2007
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67221157465984308353

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 工業與資訊管理學系碩博士班 === 95 === This paper develops a model for illustrating how to use a multiple-round compromising coordination mechanism to achieve supply chain coordination. A single supplier and multiple buyers system is considered. In the past, most research about supply chain coordination emphasized on maximizing profits of a supply chain but ignored the profit achievement of members in the supply chain. In this study, we look for a way to increase the profits of a supply chain under an environment with private information. For such an environment, the objective function and cost parameters of each facility are regarded as the private information except for the quantity discount chart and the public contract. With the private information, each member in the supply chain focuses on its own profits instead of the profits of the whole supply chain, and looks for the acceptable quantity discount and negotiation quantity by the multiple-round compromising coordination mechanism. The study shows that the profit performance with coordination is better than without coordination between the buyers and the supplier. The experimental results suggest that the supplier should focus on managing the manufacture cost, and every member in a supply chain should devote to market research. Members in a supply chain should reasonably set up a contract to share the risks for uncertainty of the market and improve the performance to maintain a long-term cooperation.