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碩士 === 國立中央大學 === 工業管理研究所 === 95 === Seasonal goods industries are characterized with a short selling season and long manufacturing lead times. Actually, customers usually willing to pay higher price than those that buy toward the end of the season. In other words, when the retailer decides the amou...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Tieh-chun Chiang, 蔣鐵軍
Other Authors: 陳振明
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2007
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83559642138337029932
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立中央大學 === 工業管理研究所 === 95 === Seasonal goods industries are characterized with a short selling season and long manufacturing lead times. Actually, customers usually willing to pay higher price than those that buy toward the end of the season. In other words, when the retailer decides the amount of initial order quantity before the selling season must consider these product characteristics. The manufacturer in order to achieve the channel’s coordination usually constructs some contracts to get the win-win under channel’s max profit. In this paper, we consider a two periods inventory model under the two-part tariff policy and return policy. We assume that the manufacturer apply a two-part tariff policy to sell their products with retailer before the selling season, and the manufacturer also apply a return price to buyback the unsold products at the end of season. Our object is to provide a win-win coordination mechanism of contract–based policies between the manufacturer and the retailer under channel’s max profit. If the mechanism can guarantee channel’s max profit but can’t assure win-win, then the contract will not be acceptable, because it may hurt one of the channel in the supply chain.