A Study on Optimal Pricing and Production Strategies for Duopoly Firms in Market Channel by Using Game Theory

碩士 === 國立屏東科技大學 === 工業管理系所 === 95 === How to use the firm’s own ascendancy creating more benefit is a goal of the firm to achieve sustainable. Beside the ascendant production, the ascendancy in channel is a key factor to earn profits. Channel power will affect to the price negotiation and then influ...

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Main Authors: Ya-Jen Yu, 游雅任
Other Authors: Yun-Cheng Huang
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2007
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/03748647175379565759
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spelling ndltd-TW-095NPUS50410252016-12-22T04:11:54Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/03748647175379565759 A Study on Optimal Pricing and Production Strategies for Duopoly Firms in Market Channel by Using Game Theory 在雙占通路結構下運用賽局理論探討最適訂價與生產策略之研究 Ya-Jen Yu 游雅任 碩士 國立屏東科技大學 工業管理系所 95 How to use the firm’s own ascendancy creating more benefit is a goal of the firm to achieve sustainable. Beside the ascendant production, the ascendancy in channel is a key factor to earn profits. Channel power will affect to the price negotiation and then influence the firm’s profit. Therefore, if the firms get wise to their rules and influence, moreover using these advantages to choose better price and production quantity, it will bring more profit to firms. Over the years, the problems of channel power being studied are usually dealt with the terms of manufacturer-dominant or retailer -dominant marketing channel, but just few study on asymmetrical-dominant marketing channel. Consequently, this study intended to apply the sub-game perfect equilibrium concept through two side duopoly within asymmetrical -dominant channel. On two conditions of the productions with substitute or complementary property, we hope to find the equilibriums. Given two manufacturers with the different cost structures, we hope to discuss the relations among manufacturers' wholesale price, the retailers' selling price and market demand. Then we find that when a manufacturer has a higher production costs than the other, it's wholesale price will be getting higher. Therefore, the retailer's selling price will be getting higher and market demand will become less as well. After analyzing and contrasting these, we derive best solution of pricing and production quantities for manufacturers and retailers. Furthermore, we provide an example to explain and analyze the relations of five Channel power and vertical integration conditions. Finally ten conclusions are drawn for future studies and practical applications. Yun-Cheng Huang 黃允成 2007 學位論文 ; thesis 166 zh-TW
collection NDLTD
language zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 國立屏東科技大學 === 工業管理系所 === 95 === How to use the firm’s own ascendancy creating more benefit is a goal of the firm to achieve sustainable. Beside the ascendant production, the ascendancy in channel is a key factor to earn profits. Channel power will affect to the price negotiation and then influence the firm’s profit. Therefore, if the firms get wise to their rules and influence, moreover using these advantages to choose better price and production quantity, it will bring more profit to firms. Over the years, the problems of channel power being studied are usually dealt with the terms of manufacturer-dominant or retailer -dominant marketing channel, but just few study on asymmetrical-dominant marketing channel. Consequently, this study intended to apply the sub-game perfect equilibrium concept through two side duopoly within asymmetrical -dominant channel. On two conditions of the productions with substitute or complementary property, we hope to find the equilibriums. Given two manufacturers with the different cost structures, we hope to discuss the relations among manufacturers' wholesale price, the retailers' selling price and market demand. Then we find that when a manufacturer has a higher production costs than the other, it's wholesale price will be getting higher. Therefore, the retailer's selling price will be getting higher and market demand will become less as well. After analyzing and contrasting these, we derive best solution of pricing and production quantities for manufacturers and retailers. Furthermore, we provide an example to explain and analyze the relations of five Channel power and vertical integration conditions. Finally ten conclusions are drawn for future studies and practical applications.
author2 Yun-Cheng Huang
author_facet Yun-Cheng Huang
Ya-Jen Yu
游雅任
author Ya-Jen Yu
游雅任
spellingShingle Ya-Jen Yu
游雅任
A Study on Optimal Pricing and Production Strategies for Duopoly Firms in Market Channel by Using Game Theory
author_sort Ya-Jen Yu
title A Study on Optimal Pricing and Production Strategies for Duopoly Firms in Market Channel by Using Game Theory
title_short A Study on Optimal Pricing and Production Strategies for Duopoly Firms in Market Channel by Using Game Theory
title_full A Study on Optimal Pricing and Production Strategies for Duopoly Firms in Market Channel by Using Game Theory
title_fullStr A Study on Optimal Pricing and Production Strategies for Duopoly Firms in Market Channel by Using Game Theory
title_full_unstemmed A Study on Optimal Pricing and Production Strategies for Duopoly Firms in Market Channel by Using Game Theory
title_sort study on optimal pricing and production strategies for duopoly firms in market channel by using game theory
publishDate 2007
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/03748647175379565759
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